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2010/The "Triumph" of the Commons
Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing his
own best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the
commons. Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all.
-Garrett Hardin
The Tragedy of the Commons.'
I. INTRODUCTION
Currently, the United States has the dubious honor of being one of the top
producers in the world of greenhouse gases ("GHGs").2 All aspects of industry-
from transportation to power generation to manufacturing-release GHGs into
the Earth's atmosphere, unconcerned with any state boundary or national
government. The Western Climate Initiative ("WCI") will be the most ambitious
attempt to reduce GHGs and combat global warming.3 However, with ambitions
come pragmatic problems, chief among these is the question of how to enforce
the parties' compliance with their obligations under the WCI. This is particularly
relevant because the WCI contains no enforcement body, and relies on nothing
but the good faith of the individual jurisdictions to enforce the agreement.
The WCI began in February of 20074 as a cooperative effort, and currently
includes seven U.S. States and four Canadian Provinces.5 The heart and soul of
the WCI is its demanding cap-and-trade system, which by the time it is fully in
place in 2015 will comprehensively regulate more GHG emissions than any other
scheme in place on the planet, with nearly ninety percent of emissions in the
member states and provinces covered by the cap.6 It will be more comprehensive
than the Northeast's Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative ("RGGI"), which
currently is the only active cap-and-trade system within the United States, but
only regulates electricity producers.7 It will also regulate more emissions than the
1. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244 (1968), available at
http://www.sciencemag.org.
2. Steven Mufson, Power-Sector Emissions of China to Top U.S., WASHINGTON POST, Aug. 27, 2008, at
DOI. The authors note that China will produce about 3.1 billion tons of C02 in 2008, up from about 2.3 billion
tons of C02 in 2007. In comparison, the U.S. emitted 2.8 billion tons in 2008. However, the U.S. electricity
usage also exceeds all other countries, approximately 9.5 tons of C02 per person, compared with 2.4 tons per
person in China, 0.6 in India and 0.1 in Brazil. Id.
3. WESTERN CLIMATE INITIATIVE: DESIGN RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE WCi REGIONAL CAP-AND-
TRADE PROGRAM 15 (Sept. 23, 2008), http://www.westernclimateinitiative.orgldocument-archives/wci-design-
recommendations [hereinafter RECOMMENDATIONS]; But see PEW CENTER ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE,
CLIMATE CHANGE 101: CAP AND TRADE 7 (2009), http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/Climatel0l-
CapTrade-Jan09.pdf [hereinafter PEW CENTER] (citing the European Union's Emission Trading System as the
"world's most ambitious and far-reaching example of greenhouse gas emissions trading").
4. RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 3, at 15.
5. Id. (including member states: Arizona, California, Montana, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah,
Washington; and member provinces: British Colombia, Manitoba, Ontario, and Quebec).
6. Id.
7. See REG'L GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, http://www.rggi.org/docs/
RGGIExecutiveSummary.pdf.
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world's leading cap-and-trade system, the European Union's Emission Trading
Scheme ("EU ETS"), which neglects to place limits on the transportation sector
(though the European Union indicates it will soon include airline traffic in its
emission permit system9). All told, the WCI will likely reduce emissions within
the region to fifteen percent of 2005 levels by 2020.0° Given its lofty goals, broad
application, and large region, the WCI stands to make a huge impact on GHG
emissions.
At the time this Comment was written, the WCI was not yet force. However,
on September 23, 2008, the WCI revealed its Design Recommendations
(hereinafter "Recommendations") detailing the scope and precise manner of
execution for its cap-and-trade system. This comment will discuss these
Recommendations, primarily exploring the issues of enforcement and
compliance. Section II begins with a brief summary of the Recommendations
themselves, and then travels to a discussion of the theoretical benefits and
problems that impact cap-and-trade systems. Section II will also comparatively
evaluate some of the problems suffered by the largest now-existing cap-and-trade
system in the world-the EU ETS. Section III addresses some of the more
problematic issues in the WCI, and briefly touches on the recognizably complex
issue of the provincial and state capacity to enter into these agreements, including
whether such agreements may be legally enforced within the terms of the
Recommendations. Finally, section IV presents the thesis of this comment by
examining the practical consequence of the partners' compliance with their
obligations. Despite an apparent lack of legal mechanisms to secure enforcement,
ultimately the confluence of the agreement's prodigious breadth and the overall
shared interests of the participating partners ensures the success of the WCI-a
proverbial "triumph" of the commons.
II. THE WESTERN CLIMATE INITIATIVE: A BRIEF OVERVIEW
A. The Nuts and Bolts of the System
The WCI is enormous in scope covering approximately 85 million people"
and encompassing roughly seventy percent of Canadian and twenty percent of
8. RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 3, at 15. This source was updated, with minor changes, in March
2009. The updated version can be found at: http://www.westemclimateinitiative.org/document-archives/wci-
design-recommendations. For a summary of the differences between the 2008 and the 2009 version see
http://www.westemclimateinitiative.org/component/remository/genera/design-recommendations/March- 13-
Correction-to-September-23-Design-Document.
9. James Kanter, Europe Forcing Airlines to Buy Emissions Permits, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2008, at B2.
10. OVERVIEW: THE WESTERN CLIMATE INITIATIVE'S CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAM DESIGN
RECOMMENDATIONS (Sept. 23, 2008), http://www.ecy.wa.gov/climatechange/WCldocs/092308WCI-
OverviewFINAL.pdf [hereinafter OVERVIEW].
11. RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 3, WCI Map located at beginning of document.
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U.S. gross domestic product. 2 It will regulate the emissions of the six major
GHGs'3 over three compliance periods beginning in 2012, each lasting three
years,' 4 and with each period phasing in a new level of reduction. The emissions
caps are to be established by estimation based upon mandatory monitoring
beginning in 2010.'" Initially, the WCI will cover only the electricity-producing
sector' 6 with transportation emissions coming under the program in the second
compliance period in 2015.'"
One of the most important aspects of the Recommendations relates to how
much it will allow the individual partner jurisdictions (hereinafter "partner[s]") to
pollute before they exceed their limit and must purchase credits on the market.
The "allowance apportionment"' 8 for emissions governs the amount of reduction
to which each partner must adhere. The apportionment is two-part, considering:
(1) the overall emissions goal of the entire region, or "regional cap;"' 9 and (2) the
individual goals created by each partner jurisdiction. ° The amount set for the cap
springs from the best estimate of expected emissions,2' but also considers
population and economic growth, as well as the concurrent voluntary and
mandatory emissions reductions. Each entity in the regulated sectors exceeding
10,000 CO 2e must report their GHG emissions subject to third party
verification.22 This uniform reporting process is filled with certain exceptions and
formulae allowing for proper flexibility in reporting, the specifics of which are
beyond the scope of this paper.23 However, once the cap is set, the individual
jurisdictions possess the sole authority to determine how many carbon credits
24each polluting sector receives. Notably, this allows for the individual states and
provinces to maintain a strong element of control over their corresponding
reduction obligations, allowing the partners to consider what is best for local
industry in meeting their allotment goals. This independence begs a very
12. OVERVIEW, supra note 10.
13. RECOMMENDATION, supra note 3, at I (regulating carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide,
perfluorocarbons ("PFCs"), hydrofluorocarbons ("HFCs"), and sulfur hexafluoride).
14. Id. at 4 & n.7 (3 year compliance periods are: 2012-2014, 2015-2017, 2018-2020).
15. Id. at 11.
16. Id. at 1
17. Id. at2.
18. Id. at 5 & n.8 (defining "allowance apportionment" as the "Partner's budget or share of WCI region-
wide GHG emission allowances. Allowance budgets must be set for each Partner jurisdiction.").
19. Id. at 4 & n.6 (defining "regional cap" as "the overall limit on total emissions included in the cap-
and-trade program.").
20. Id. at 5.
21. Id. at 27.
22. Id. at 43.
23. See generally WESTERN CLIMATE INITIATIVE, FINAL ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENTS OF MANDATORY
REPORTING (July 15, 2009), http://www.westernclimateinitiative.org/componentlremository/Reporting-
Committee-Documents/Final-Essential-Requirements-for-Mandatory-Reporting.
24. RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 3, at 31-32.
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important question-what happens when partners do not comply with their
obligations?
B. Theoretical Problems with Cap-and-Trade System
The compliance and enforcement 25 procedures are central to this comment.
The WCI currently recommends that if an entity26 does not have sufficient carbon
allowances at the end of the compliance period, either because it exhausted its
allowances or failed to purchase further ones, that entity must relinquish three
allowances for every excess metric ton of CO2e.27 There is no further assessment
of monetary penalty. The market is the sole regulator here, setting the penalty
price by virtue of the carbon offsets offending entities must purchase. 2' This
market reliance is by design. It would be impossible, the Recommendations say,
to assure any set penalty amount would exceed the market cost of the
allowances;" a set penalty below market cost of compliance would quickly erode
the efficacy of the cap-and-trade market. However, the Recommendations do not
preclude the partners from establishing individual criminal or civil penalties for
violations within their own jurisdictions.3°
Predictably, the exclusive reliance on the market to provide penalties creates
a new complication in itself. The European Union stumbled over this during the
creation of its carbon trading market when some jurisdictions issued too many
credits to polluters.' The consequent saturation of the carbon credit market
reduced their value by half,32 precipitating a situation whereby a failure to meet
emissions requirements brought a negligible financial penalty. It has taken years
for that market to significantly recover.33 What is most startling about this
cautionary tale is not how a similar situation would decimate the ability of the
WCI to have any penalties whatsoever, but-given the independent nature of the
member states-how easily it would be for a similar situation to occur. With each
jurisdiction maintaining its individual sovereignty to issue credits as it sees
appropriate, a similar problem is a very real possibility.
25. Id. at 46 (defining"[einforcement [as] the means of assuring covered entities compliance with the
cap-and-trade program.").
26. Id. at 3 n.4 (defining "entity" as a company that must cover the cost of CO2e it is importing as power,
and generally used when the point at which emissions are regulated and monitored is upstream from the point at
which they are actually used).
27. Id. at 46; see also id. at 3 n.4 (explaining that CO2e is the carbon dioxide equivalent using the GHG
power of one metric ton of Carbon Dioxide as the basic unit of measurement).
28. Id. at 46.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. James Kanter, The Trouble with Markets for Carbon, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2008, at C 1.
32. Id.
33. See id.
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Overall, enforcement is very decentralized; the Recommendations providing
no overarching management board or enforcement agency. 31 Each partner is
responsible for enforcement procedures" and is entitled to assess its own
penalties for failure to comply.3 6 Nevertheless, the Recommendations do call for
a "regional organization"37  to facilitate administrative tasks, improve
communication, reduce administrative costs, and "improve program transparency
and consistency."3 All the same, the organization's authority will be limited and
shall not exceed the authority of the individual partners.39
In a strange showing of self-assurance, the Recommendations cite the RGGI
as a successful example of a similar administrative organization. That
organization, it claims, has been very effective at coordinating the
implementation of that region's cap-and-trade system.40 To be sure, the RGGI has
been relatively successful thus far, however, its success does not imply the
success of a comparable administrative body within the WCI. Placing an
analogous faith is misguided for two primary reasons.
The first is that the RGGI has an immense advantage regarding the very
cornerstone of the entire cap-and-trade system4-its emissions monitoring.
Determining which industries will be regulated, how many allowances those
industries should be given and whether they have exceeded their allotment, all
depend on accurate emissions monitoring systems. The RGGI uses emissions
data from the electronic emissions regulation systems already in place through
the Environmental Protection Agency's Acid Rain Program (hereinafter "the
Program").42 Succinctly stated, the Program is the U.S. effort to reduce sulfur
emissions in the U.S. as part of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990.4' An
agreement with Canada followed, which established "specific. .. limitations or
reductions of sulfur dioxide. . . ."44 That Agreement sought to reduce the total
34. See generally RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 3.
35. Id. at 46 ("Participants must be accountable for their emissions and must comply with requirements
for monitoring, reporting, and holding adequate emissions allowances.").
36. Id.
37. Id. at 47 ("A regional organization centralizes the execution of administrative tasks for the WCI
Partner jurisdictions.").
38. Id. at 47-48 (other responsibilities of the organization include: to "[c]oordinate the regional auction
of allowances; [tirack emissions and provide public information on progress towards the WCI regional goal;
[m]onitor and report on market activity... [c]oordinate, review and adopt[] protocols for offsets .....
39. ld. at 47.
40. Id. at 47-48.
41. See id.
42. REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, OVERVIEW OF RGGI CO, BUDGET TRADING PROGRAM 1,
8 (Oct. 2007), http://rggi.org/docs/program summary-10-07.pdf.
43. NATIONAL ACID PRECIPITATION ASSESSMENT PROGRAM, REPORT TO CONGRESS: AN INTEGRATED
ASSESSMENT 1 (2005) [hereinafter NATIONAL], available at http:/www.esrl.noaa.govlcsdlaqrslreportsl
napapreport05.pdf.
44. Agreement on Air Quality, U.S.-Can., at 4, Mar. 13, 1991, TIAS No. 11,783, amended by Protocol
Amending the Agreement on Air Quality, U.S.-Can., Dec. 7, 2000, Temp. State Dep't No. 01-20, Hein's No.
KAV 5863.
Global Business & Development Law Journal / Vol. 22
amount of sulfur dioxide released into the atmosphere by both countries 5 under
the belief that such emissions were a significant cause of the acid rain46 that was
believed to be poisoning the waterways of the two countries. This agreement
between the two countries was really one of the first to address large-scale
"transboundary air pollution"48 emitted in large part from utilities in the two
countries.49
The total cost and ease with which the RGGI administers is low, albeit
deceptive, for a reason. This EPA Program uses Continuous Emission
Monitoring Systems ("CEMS") on approximately thirty-six of the regulated
industries, accounting for ninety-six percent of regulated emissions. ° Because the
RGGI covers only those emissions from power plants within the partner states,5'
and a substantial number of those emissions are already monitored by the
aforementioned accurate CEMS, the RGGI has a very strong and accurate
foundation. Consequently the RGGI's regulatory body has fewer hurdles-both
because of fewer regulated industries (only power plants under the RGGI) to
oversee and an efficient monitoring system in place for the only industry it
regulates. If the cornerstone of a cap-and-trade system is accurate monitoring, the
RGGI is seemingly destined for success.
These CEMS that the RGGI is so fortunate to utilize, are incredibly
expensive and not likely to be used in similar scope under the WCI. The CEMS
machines used to monitor emissions under the Program cost $124,000 per unit
when they were installed in 19952 In total, installation of the CEMS units
accounted for seven percent of total compliance costs in 1995 alone.53 Though the
WCI will benefit from these very same CEMS systems monitoring emissions
under the Program, because the WCI will regulate far more than just the
electricity-producing sector (the RGGI's only focus), including, inter alia
transportation fuel combustion, residential and industrial fuel combustion, and
45. EDITH BROWN WEISS, STEPHEN C. MCCAFFRREY, DANIEL BARSTOW MAGRAW & A. DAN
TARLOCK, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 502-05 (2d ed. 2006).
46. NATIONAL, supra note 43 (stating that "[Alcid rain occurs when emissions of sulfur dioxide and
nitrogen oxides react in the atmosphere (with water, oxygen, and various oxidants) to form various acidic
compounds.").
47. WEISS ET AL, supra note 45, at 503 (quoting a 1988 Canadian report that "14,000 lakes and at least
nine salmon-bearing rivers were dead due to acid rain .... ).
48. Id. at 501-02 (defining transboundary air pollution as "air pollution whose physical origin is situated
wholly or in part within the area under the national jurisdiction of one State and which has adverse effects in the
area under the jurisdiction of another State.").
49. See Agreement on Air Quality, U.S.-Can., at 24, Mar. 13, 1991, TIAS No. 11,783, amended by
Protocol Amending the Agreement on Air Quality, U.S.-Can., Dec. 7, 2000, Temp. State Dep't No. 01-20,
Hein's No. KAV 5863.
50. Lesley K. McAllister, Putting Persuasion Back in the Equation: Compliance in Cap and Trade
Programs, 24 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 299, 318 (Summer 2007).
51. See REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, supra note 7.
52. McAllister, supra note 50, at 319 n.140.
53. Id.
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54industrial process emissions sources, these sources will not benefit from an
already in-place CEMS. Accordingly, for those industries not benefiting from
CEMS, regulation and reporting could be much more difficult and expensive.
The second glaring difference between the RGGI and WCI is the fact that the
RGGI operates solely within the jurisdiction of the United States." As a
consequence, potential disputes may resort to the U.S. court system, a luxury the
WCI cannot afford due to its international nature. Considering these factors, one
might deduce that the reason for the success of the RGGI's administrative body
is because it has had the luxury of relying on the EPA established CEMS for
emissions monitoring, and the United States courts for dispute resolution. Due to
these crucial differences, the WCI Recommendations should be cautious in
exalting the RGGI as a model for administrative efficiency. As stated previously,
that program has many advantages the WCI will not experience, and surely it
cannot follow that the success of the RGGI's administrative body indicates any
amount of success for the similar WCI body.
C. Theoretical Benefits of a Cap-and-Trade System
To be fair, a cap-and-trade system has many advantages, at least in theory.
Proponents of the system-the Recommendations included - typically cite the
increase in efficiency that these programs offer compared to similar command-
and-control models.56 These models are efficient because a government involved
in the WCI needs only: "(1) to ensure that covered sources accurately report their
emissions and.. . surrender a number of allowances equal to their emissions; and
(2) to provide some market oversight to ensure fair competition." The
Recommendations point to the success of the EPA's Program as a model of this
efficiency because it managed a huge amount of polluters with a minimal
expenditure of resources." However, as addressed in the preceding section, the
absence of CEMS for many of the regulated GHG sources suggest the WCI is not
likely to be similarly efficient.
More traditional approaches like a flat carbon tax on emissions, or an overall
emissions reduction goal wherein each polluter must reduce by a set percentage,
have greater costs and less flexibility. Cap-and-trade systems increase
administrative efficiency by allowing regulated facilities the "flexibility in
54. RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 3, at 1-2.
55. See Memorandum of Understanding, Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (2005), available at
http://rggi.org/docs/mou-final 12_20_05.pdf (participating states in RGGI: Connecticut, Delaware, Maine,
Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont).
56. McAllister, supra note 50, at 332.
57. See RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 3, at 49.
58. ld.'at 49 n.30 ("For example, the U.S. acid rain program requires a staff of approximately 50 people
to track all emissions data, allowance transfer, and compliance for over 4000 sources including auditing of all
hourly emissions data, tracking several thousand allowance transfers per year, annual compliance
determination, and annual program assessment.").
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determining whether, when, and how to reduce their emissions., 59 At its most
basic, cap-and-trade systems permit those facilities where the cost of compliance
with regulations is prohibitively high (possibly resulting in a disproportionate
increase in consumer prices) to trade carbon credits with those facilities who
could more easily comply with emissions levels. This reduces the overall cost of
emissions reduction per CO 2e unit.6° Moreover, because an ever-fluctuating
market sets the cost of compliance, regulated facilities are free to determine their
own approach to their compliance obligations. 6' This means that the facility could
choose to spend its money investing in new facilities or technologies to reduce
emissions, or could just choose to purchase more credits on the market. This
theoretically avoids the commonplace negotiations between the regulating
agency and the offending party, thereby reducing cost of administration. Under
such a model, the state is no longer saddled with the burden of mandating the
appropriate amount of reductions for an individual facility, nor need the state
spend valuable resources negotiating with facilities on how to best achieve
compliance.62 In turn, "[1]itigation that used to be common with respect to setting,
implementing, and enforcing technology-based standards is eliminated. 63
In contrast, traditional command-and-control schemes require the
government take a stronger, more diligent role in securing compliance, thereby
increasing the total cost of compliance on all parties. A simple look reveals
governments must not only establish an entity's reduction obligations, but also
determine if the entity is in compliance, and if not, enforce the payment of fines
or taxes for failure to meet the obligations. Though this cursory explanation
oversimplifies both process and problems, the traditional scheme is likely to be
prohibitive in cost.64 Compared to the alternative command and control
schemes, 65 cap-and-trade systems have a lower cost of operation while also
encouraging technological innovation through the natural tendency of markets to
promote and reward those technologies that empower regulated entitles to
achieve a market advantage. 66
The fact that the WCI is a regional program with multiple partners is also a
sizeable advantage. The breadth of the program will help reduce the costs of
trade, and reduce the effects of emissions leakage.67 "Emissions leakage occurs
when economic activity and associated emissions shift out of the jurisdiction
59. McAllister, supra note 50, at 332.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. See RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 3, at 49.
65. Id. (defining command-and-control scheme as those "programs in which governments specify
various performance, operational, or emission[s] requirements based upon technology").
66. See id; see also PEW CENTER, supra note 3, at 3 ("Under traditional command-and-control
regulation, there is no incentive to go beyond the regulatory standard.").
67. RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 3, at 50.
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covered by the policy in order to avoid the costs of compliance., 68 Naturally, this
would prove economically detrimental for those participating jurisdictions. A
larger regulated area where compliance costs are fairly stable and equal makes it
more difficult for industry to move to an unregulated area.69 Avoiding compliance
should not be as simple as packing the bags and moving to a neighboring state.
The Recommendations also note that the substantial size of the program will
further lower the cost of implementation by sharing administrative and technical
support functions between jurisdictions. °
In sum, the WCI is a grouping of eleven partners, each pledging to regulate
themselves and to penalize offending entities. Absent a strong enforcement board
with the authority to punish offending jurisdictions, it would appear the primary
enforcement mechanism of the WCI is its transparency, essentially "shaming" an
offending state into compliance with the rest of the partners. However, as this
comment will later address in section IV, this particular approach will likely
prove to be more effective than it appears on its face.
III. PROBLEMS INHERENT IN THE WCI
As zealous as the WCI is, it relies upon an optimism that overlooks some
very manifest issues. Because the WCI is an agreement between states and
provinces, there is a minuscule-though largely settled-issue whether those
partners have the capacity to legally engage in the agreement in the first place.
Further, given the total absence of specified sanctions or the establishment of a
regulatory body, is the agreement facially unenforceable, that is, does the
agreement provide the mechanisms necessary for enforcement? For that matter, if
none exist, are there other mechanisms that would provide the WCI strength and
ensure compliance?
It should be noted that an agreement of this magnitude, which places
significant restraints on twenty percent of the total United States economy, may
face a federal preemption issue. However, the preemption question is beyond the
scope of this comment. Instead, it will limit discussion to the primary
international issues, and to an examination of the aforementioned major problems
the WCI drafters will likely face during the formation and execution of this
program.
68. Id.
69. See id.
70. Id.
410
Global Business & Development Law Journal / Vol. 22
A. The U.S. and Canadian Capacities to Enter into the Agreement7'
The ability of the states and provinces to enter into an agreement, in theory,
presents a conflict because the U.S. Constitution appears to plainly prohibit
agreements by states with foreign powers. The "Compact Clause" unequivocally
states that "[n]o state shall, without the consent of Congress . . . enter into any
agreement or compact with another state, or with a foreign power .... ""
In spite of this seemingly clear prohibition, the modem interpretation of the
"Compact Clause," as stated in Virginia v. Tennessee,73 permits these agreements.
Addressing the validity of a boundary agreement entered into between Virginia
and Tennessee, the Court focused on whether the agreement required the
"Compact Clause's" requirement of congressional consent. It held such
agreements permissible, and consequently did not require congressional consent
where they did not extend the political power of the states, nor encroach upon the
supremacy of the United States.74 The RESTATEMENT ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
echoes this tenet,75 and sums up the current state of the law:
In general, agreements involving local transborder issues, such as agreements
to curb a source of pollution, to coordinate police or sewage services, or to share
an energy source, have been considered not to require Congressional consent.
Such agreements are not international agreements under the criteria stated in §
76301 (1), but other State compacts might be.
There is also the small issue of the Canadian capacity to enter into these
agreements. The Canadian Constitution differs patently from the U.S.
Constitution in that it does not reserve exclusive foreign affairs powers to the
federal government. 77 However, Canadian courts recognize at common law that
71. For an extensive and interesting discussion on the issue of U.S. constitutional limitations on state
agreements with foreign nations, see Peter R. Jennetten, Note, State Environmental Agreements with Foreign
Powers: The Compact Clause and The Foreign Affairs Power of the States, 8 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 141
(1995).
72. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3; Cf U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 2, cl. 2. (giving the President power to make
treaties with the consent of the Senate).
73. 148 U.S. 503, 519 (1893).
74. id. (quoting 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES:
WITH A PRELIMINARY REVIEW OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE COLONIES AND STATES BEFORE THE
ADOPTION OF THE CONSTITUTION § 1403, (Melville M. Bigelow ed., 5th ed., photo reprint 1994) (1891).).
75. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 302 cmt. f (1987) (stating that "a State compact
with a foreign power requires Congressional consent only if the compact tends 'to the increase of political
power in the States which may encroach upon or interfere with the just supremacy of the United States."').
76. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 302 cmt. f; see generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 301 (1) ("'international agreement' means an agreement between two or more states
or international organizations that is intended to be legally binding and is governed by international law."); see
also JANICE CHERYL BEAVER, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT FOR CONGRESS: U.S.
INTERNATIONAL BORDERS: BRIEF FACTS (Nov. 9, 2006), available at http://italy.usembassy.gov/pdf/other/
RS21729.pdf (citing the U.S.-Canadian border spanning 3,987 miles, and the U.S.-Mexico border spanning
1,933 miles).
77. Marcia Valiante, The Great Lakes Charter Annex 2001: Legal Dimensions of Provincial
Participation, 13 J. ENVTL. L. & PRAC. 47, 63 (2003).
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the treaty making power resides in the executive power.78 Similar to the U.S.,
legislative consent is not requisite for valid agreements, but they may not impede
or diminish the federal powers."
The Canadian treatment of these agreements could also be an issue because
absent an express clause in an agreement stipulating the method of dispute
resolution, Canadian courts treat agreements with sub-nations as generally
unenforceable. 0 These agreements can be terminated unilaterally without legal
82
recourse" based upon the principle of parliamentary sovereignty. This concept
creates a problem for an agreement like the WCI because Canadian custom
provides political justification for provincial governments to terminate
agreements at will. Fortunately, provincial repudiation of an agreement as
important as the WCI is extremely unlikely, because the provinces typically
"treat[] [agreements] with a high level of political respect," 3 "altering their
,84
commitments under a political accord only in dramatic circumstances....
1. The Modern Application: Similar Agreements
The U.S. Constitution's prohibition on agreements with foreign nations
notwithstanding, modernly states possess this capacity, particularly regarding
environmental issues. An examination of some of these agreements provides
insight into how the WCI may be received at the federal level, as well as how the
enforcement issue has previously been addressed by similar agreements.
The Great Lakes Charter (hereinafter "Charter") of 1985 sought to limit the
amount of water diverted from the Great Lakes.85 Despite their size, the Great
Lakes are essentially a "nonrenewable resource," replenished annually by only
one percent of their volume.86 Recognizing this problem, eight states and two
provinces87 entered into an agreement to place a cap on the amount of water that
78. Id. (citing PETER HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN CANADA § 11.6 (4th ed. Supp. 1997).
79. Id. at 63-64 (citing Canada v. Saskatchewan Water Corp., [1991] I W.W.R. 426 (Can.)).
80. Id. at 64, 66.
81. id. at 64.
82. Id. at 64 & n.62 (defining parliamentary sovereignty as the principle by which "Parliament and
provincial Legislatures reserve the power to modify the decisions of their predecessors.").
83. Id. at 66 (citing John Whyte, Issues in Canadian Federal-Provincial Cooperation, in MANAGING
NATURAL RESOURCES IN A FEDERAL STATE: ESSAYS FROM THE SECOND BANFF CONFERENCE ON NATURAL
RESOURCE LAW 322, 324-25 ( J. Owen Saunders ed., 1986).
84. Id. at 66-67.
85. COUNCIL OF GREAT LAKES GOVERNORS, THE GREAT LAKES CHARTER: PRINCIPLES FOR THE
MANAGEMENT OF GREAT LAKES WATER RESOURCES 1 (Feb. 11, 1985), available at http://www.
cglg.org/projects/water/docs/GreatLakesCharter.pdf [hereinafter "CHARTER"].
86. INT'L JOINT COMM'N, PROTECTION OF THE WATERS OF THE GREAT LAKES: FINAL REPORT TO THE
GOVERNMENTS OF CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES 1 (2000), available at http://www.ijc.
org/phplpublications/pdf/lD 1560.pdf.
87. CHARTER, supra note 85, at 7 (citing State signatories Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, New
York, Ohio, Wisconsin and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania; and Provincial signatories Ontario and
Quebec).
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could be "diverted" from the Lakes without consultation with the other party
members.88 Much like the current WCI, the Charter relied on "good faith
performance" of the agreement and lacked any sort of overarching compliance or
enforcement procedures. 9 Moreover, it preserved the individual state's right to
make decisions in its own interest,9° as well as to pursue legal action in any
desired forum. 9'
The agreement remained undisturbed by either the Canadian or U.S.
governments until in 1998 when the Ontario Ministry of the Environment issued
92
a permit to withdraw 10,000,000 liters per day from Lake Superior. In the face
of huge public outcry, the government withdrew the permit. 93 Nonetheless,
Ontario's actions illustrate the flimsy quality of an agreement bound together by
the concept of good faith dealings (though affirms the power of the public voice).
This enforcement issue, among other problems in the Charter, prompted the
subsequent passing of the Great Lakes Charter Annex and the St. Lawrence-
River Basin Agreement and Compact.94 The latter compact was drafted in 20059'
and as of October 3, 2008 finally became law. 96
Another agreement addressing a regional environmental concern is the 2001
Oil Spill Memorandum of Cooperation (hereinafter "Memorandum") between the
Pacific States97  and British Colombia. Originally signed in 1989, the
Memorandum established planning procedures for oil spill response, prevention
methods, and consistency between the separate jurisdictions.98 Largely because
the law governing agreements between U.S. states and foreign states is so
ambiguous, the Memorandum contains disclaimers, that are intended to avoid
conflict with constitutional and federal limitations, stating its intent not to "create
88. Id. at 4.
89. Id. at 5.
90. Id. ("The Great Lakes States and Provinces mutually recognize the rights and standing of all Great
Lakes States and Provinces to represent and protect the rights and interests of their respective jurisdictions and
citizens in the shared water and other natural resources of the Great Lakes region.").
91. Id. at 6 ("Each Great Lakes State and Province reserves and retains all rights and authority to seek, in
any state, provincial, federal, or other appropriate court or forum, adjudication or protection . .
92. Valiante, supra note 77, at 54.
93. Id.
94. See Lauren Petrash, Great Lakes, Weak Policy: The Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin
Sustainable Water Resources Agreement and Compact and Non-Regulation of the Water "Products" Industry,
39 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 145, 155-57 (2007).
95. Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin Water Resources Compact, Dec. 13, 2005, available at
http://www.cglg.org/projects/water/docs/12-13-05/GreatLakes-
StLawrenceRiverBasinWaterResourcesCompact.pdf.
96. Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin Water Resources Compact, Pub L. 110-342, 122 Stat. 3739
(2008).
97. The Pacific States/British Columbia: Oil Spill Task Force, 2001 Oil Spill Memorandum of
Cooperation, http://www.oilspilltaskforce.org/memo-cooperation.htm (Alaska, California, Hawaii, Oregon,
Washington) [hereinafter Oil Spill Memorandum].
98. Id.
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any separate legal or administrative entity,"99 and that "each party may terminate
its agreement at will . .. ."'0'
New York, Vermont, and Quebec have also entered into environmental
covenants over Lake Champlain.'' The cooperation between these parties began
with the 1988 Memorandum of Understanding on Environmental Cooperation on
Lake Chaplain. Since then, the parties have continuously renewed their
102commitment to this Memorandum, most recently in 2003. One of the
provisions of this Memorandum requires the parties to "'give prior notice and...
consult' before commencing 'major action or project [which] would be likely to
adversely affect [the other party]."" 3 The memorandum is very similar to the
Charter's primary purpose of notification and consultation, yet unlike that
covenant, it contains no provision expressly indicating the nonbinding nature of
the agreement.'°4 This failure to explicitly define the nature of enforcement may
prove problematic because current authorities are undecided whether this type of
agreement necessarily implies the enforcement mechanism.',0 However, although
the three jurisdictions are not strictly obligated to comply with these agreements,
in practice the three jurisdictions treat them as "binding covenants."'16
Other examples of agreements between U.S. and foreign states include the
Friendship Protocol Alaska has with Russia. 0 7 The government of Alaska has
many Memorandums of Understanding with the Russians on environmental and
natural resource issues. '°8 These memorandums contain the often-important
language that they will not "bind the state to a specific course of action or require
the commitment of funds."' 9 This language, like that in the Vermont/Quebec
agreement, reflects an awareness of the primary limitation regarding state/foreign
state agreements: agreements are likely valid provided they do not "increase [the]
political power [of] the [state] . . .
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Jennetten, supra note 71, at 171.
102. WILLIAM G. HOWLAND ET AL, LAKE CHAMPLAIN: EXPERIENCE AND LESSONS LEARNED BRIEF 97
(2005) http://www.iwleam.net/publications/lllakechamplain-2005.pdf.
103. Id. (quoting Memorandum of Understanding on Environmental Cooperation §5, Quebec-New
York, May 10, 1993 (on file with the Georgetown International Environmental Law Review)).
104. Compare Id., with CHARTER, supra note 85, at 1.
105. Compare Jennetten, supra note 71, at 171 (suggesting the agreement's non-binding nature is
implicit in the memorandum of understanding format), with RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS §
301 cmt. a (1987) (listing "memorandum of understanding" as a designation of binding international agreement,
and further stating that "[w]hatever their designation, all agreements have the same legal status ... .
106. HOWLAND ET AL, supra note 102, at 97.
107. Jennetten, supra note 71, at 172.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 302 cmt. f (1987).
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The Great Lakes Basin Compact of 1968." (hereinafter "Compact") offers a
cautionary tale for state governments seeking agreements with foreign states. The
Compact provided for the establishment of a Great Lakes Commission, which
would primarily act as a policy recommending body to the party states. ' 2 It also
stated that the provinces of Quebec and Ontario would be coequal states within
the agreement." 3 After ratification by five of the member states, the covenant
became effective in 1955.14 However, at the time of the covenant's conception
the ability of states to make such agreements was unclear.
Faced with the constitutional limitation on agreements, the parties sought to
guarantee its legality by eliciting the consent of Congress."5 Congress objected to
the compact primarily on the grounds that it usurped powers that had been within
the scope of the federal government.1 6 Specifically, the Great Lakes Commission
appeared to effectively function in much the same way as the International Joint
Commission," 7 established by the Boundary Waters Treaty in 1909."8 During
Congressional hearings on the issue, the State Department specifically objected
to the Canadian membership because "it infringed upon State Department turf."
' 19
Apparently, the executive department preferred it retain the sole authority to
make recommendations to foreign states. Congress ultimately consented to the
Compact, but under the conditions that it exclude the Canadian province's
membership, and that the Great Lakes Commission would have the ability to
make any recommendations to the provinces.' 20 As one scholar pointed out, the
irony of that process was that the Compact did not likely require consent of
Congress to be valid, but instead was "sought mainly to ensure the validity of
Canadian involvement."' 2'1 Of course, it was this very action that lead to the
exclusion of Canadian involvement.
B. Lessons from Experience: A Case Study in the European System
1. A Look at the European Union Emission Trading System
The global economic crisis that occurred in the last quarter of 2008 cautions
against an agreement relying on good faith and individual regulation because the
111. Great Lake Basin Compact, Pub L. 90-419, 82 Stat. 412 (1968), available at http://www.
glc.org/about/glbc.html.
112. Jennetten, supra note 71, at 165.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 166.
117. Id.
118. Petrash, supra note 94, at 153.
119. Jennetten. supra note 71, at 166-67.
120. Id. at 167.
121. Id.
2010 / The "Triumph" of the Commons
WCI deals with massive economies on the scale of the European Union
("E.U.") 22 This similarity cautions that many of the same problems the E.U. has
experienced implementing its ETS could be felt by WCI partners.
Towards the end of 2008, countries and industries faced with a debilitating
recession began to vehemently oppose the third phase of the E.U. Emissions
Trading System ("ETS"). The ETS currently allocates carbon credits to the
industries mostly without charge.123 However, beginning in 2013 the proposed
third phase will begin auctioning a percentage of the previously free emissions
allowances to industrial polluters.'2 The ETS will initially mandate the polluters
purchase thirty percent of their emissions allowances and increase incrementally
until one hundred percent of the allowances will be auctioned by 2020.12
Some E.U. leaders are demanding a less stringent standard than proposed,
with the leaders of Italy, Poland, and Latvia threatening to veto the new standards
unless they are softened. 116 In October of 2008, Poland, Hungary, Slovakia,
Romania, and Bulgaria reached an accord of their own calling for a more gradual
approach to the new phase of the ETS.' 27 The countries stated the new phase
would threaten "external competitiveness of the European industry, labor market
and financial situation of households."'28 The Eastern European countries are at a
distinct disadvantage in the ETS because they derive the majority of their power
from coal fired plants'29 and thus would have to pay more under the ETS to
generate power than their western counterparts.
For these emerging economies, coal is a natural choice. Proponents of the
energy source claim that coal reserves will last at least two hundred years
compared with fifty years for oil and natural gas. 3° It is comparatively cheaper
than alternative energies, notwithstanding the recent rise in prices.'' Perhaps
most importantly, hundreds of countries mine coal, 3 2 creating a more reliable and
constant energy stream free from foreign influence, thus avoiding the threat of
supply interruption as a means of political influence.
122. Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook: European Union, available at https://www.cia.
gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ee.html (last updated Oct. 8, 2009) (stating 2007 E.U. GDP as
$14.79 trillion).
123. EU Politics: Summit Deal on Climate/Energy Package, ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT:
VIEWSWIRE, Jan. 8, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR 472095.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. James Kanter, Europe's Leadership in Carbon Control at Risk in Credit Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
21,2008, at B 10 [hereinafter Kanter, Europe's Leadership].
127. James Kanter, Poland Leads Charge to Delay European Climate Reforms, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6,
2008 [hereinafter Kanter, Poland Leads Charge].
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Elisabeth Rosenthal, Europe Turns to Coal Again, Raising Alarms on Climate Change, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 23, 2008, at Al.
131. Id.
132. Id.
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In recent years, interruption of supply, or the threat thereof, has become a
major problem for eastern countries like Ukraine, Georgia, Belarus, and the rest
of Europe'33 as well. The Russian gas monopoly Gazprom imposes significantly
higher rates on those countries more sympathetic to the West.' 3 With forty
percent of European gas coming from Russia,3 - the members of the E.U. are
eager to develop other methods of energy production. Countries unable to afford
development of alternative energy claim that penalties for the use of coal will
only push them towards a heavier reliance on natural gas136 resulting in a weaker
supply stream, and greater dependence on the often fragile mood of the Russian
administration. Meanwhile, the leaders of countries who receive the bulk of their
energy from non-carbon sources such as wind and nuclear power are pushing for
the new standards.'37 Under the E.U. ETS, cleaner companies gain profits from
the sale of extra carbon credits to more polluting industries such as those in the
eastern bloc. These conflicting economic situations are threatening harmonious
functioning of the ETS.
Private companies also expressed their exasperation with the proposed third
phase. Recently Ineos, a chemical company and Britain's largest private
employer, threatened to move to a country with less stringent emissions standards
should the United Kingdom adopt the tougher E.U. admissions standards. 38 Its
CEO estimated that as many as 200,000 jobs would be at risk in the UK alone. 39
Referenced previously in this comment, this exodus of jobs is known as "carbon
leakage,"' 4 and is one of the biggest fears regarding cap-and-trade systems.
Moreover, the dual threats of carbon leakage and supply interruption illustrate the
incredible economic stakes at play within the WCI.
As hinted at earlier in section II, there is another problem regarding the
actual allowance requests made by the jurisdictions. The E.U. and WCI have cap-
and-trade systems founded on the mandatory GHG emissions reporting from the
various sectors to be regulated.' 4' Jurisdictions then propose the amount of
133. See Andrew E. Kramer, Russia Cuts Gas; Europe Shivers, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2009, at Al
[hereinafter Kramer, Russia Cuts Gas]; see also Kramer, infra note 133 (Gazprom warns Poland, Lithuania and
Germany of potential disruptions in natural gas supply).
134. See Andrew E. Kramer, Gazprom Warns of Wider Cutoffs if Belarus Interferes With Gas, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 28, 2006, at A 18 (comparing gas prices in Ukraine at $135 per 1,000 cubic meters, pro-western
government of Georgia at $235 per 1,000 cubic meters, and Western Europe at $265 per 1,000 cubic meters).
135. Kramer, Russia Cuts Gas, supra note 133.
136. Kanter, Poland Leads Charge, supra note 127.
137. See Kanter, Europe's Leadership, supra note 126.
138. Danny Forston, Chemical Boss Warns of Exodus: Prime Minister is Urged to Change EU Climate
Change Rules to Prevent Mass Exit, SUNDAY TIMES (UK), Dec. 7, 2008, available at http://business.
timesonline.co.UK/tollbusiness/industrysectors/industrials/article5299219.ece.
139. Id.
140. See id.
141. Compare supra Part II (explaining that initially, only the electricity-producing sector will be
covered, with transportation emissions to follow in the second compliance period in 2005), with Pew Center,
supra note 4, at 3 (providing that "[s]ome sectors that might be included under the cap are electric power,
manufacturing, transportation, or fossil fuel use.").
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allowances they should receive. The allowance estimate is crucial because an
excess of granted allowances will flood the market with credits, thereby driving
down the price of carbon and interfering with the state's abilities to regulate and
penalize the excessive emission of GHG. 
4 1
In the E.U., one of the most contentious times in the system occurs when the
state submits its National Allocation Plan (NAP), to the overall governing body
of the European Commission (hereinafter "the Commission").' 43 The Commission
is then free to accept or reject the proposal, and frequently has. The Commission
uses the denial of the allocation as a tool to regulate what it determines are
excessively generous allocations to particular sectors, or to motivate a country to
move more quickly in a particular area.'" The countries may be free to propose
their own carbon allocations, but the Commission has the final authority. The
process is extremely contentious and the Commission has threatened legal action
in some instances,' 45 and in others, has had legal action threatened against it. 146 In
recent review, the Commission rejected Germany's proposal for its allocation for
the period 2008-2012, notwithstanding Germany's initial voluntary reduction.'
47
Germany responded by threatening to sue the Commission in the European Court
of Justice.
Disputes in the E.U. over allocations demonstrate an important deficiency in
the WCI. The Recommendations do not create an institution analogous to the
Commission. It instead relies on self-regulation and transparency to ensure the
healthy carbon market that is the backbone of the entire system. The E.U. has this
transparency, but in verifying all members adhere to their obligations it also has a
weapon the WCI does not have: litigation (or the always-persuasive threat of
action) in an international court of justice.
The various economic conditions created by assorted methods of electricity
production and industry pose a serious divergence of interests. Though all
member states agree that reducing GHG emissions is paramount, countries like
Poland, who derive the bulk of their electricity from coal-fired power plants,
believe the sudden cap on their electricity is unfair. After all, decades of
unregulated industry permitted and vitalized the very nations who now seek to
place the most stringent caps.
To address the problem of carbon leakage, the Commission will analyze
those industries that are particularly susceptible to carbon leakage in 2010. If the
142. See supra Part 11.
143. See PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, THE EUROPEAN UNION EMISSIONS TRADING
SCHEME (EU-ETS) INSIGHTS AND OPPORTUNITIES 2, 12 (2005) [hereinafter PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE
CHANGE].
144. See id.
145. Id.
146. Judit Zegnil, European Commission Unveils New Energy Policy, BUDAPEST BUS. J., Jan. 15, 2007,
available at 2007 WLNR 798443.
147. Id. (reporting that Germany's allocation was permitted to be 453.1 million tons of C02, down from
the proposed 462 million tons, which had been initially voluntarily reduced from 485 million tons).
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Commission determines they are particularly susceptible to losing business to
unregulated nations, those industries will be allotted a greater amount of free
credits, more so in those situations where the industry in question uses the best
available technology. 148
2. Comparing the WCI and the E. U. ETS
Similar disharmony will likely affect the partners of the WCI, as some states
will certainly find the transition into a carbon emissions cap system easier. One
of these states will be California, who in December 2008 finally adopted its
carbon emissions reduction plan into law.'4 9 The plan will offer the most
sweeping GHG reductions of any state in the nation.5 ° Despite extensive public
debate on the matter, the plan's proponents, including California Governor
Arnold Schwarzenegger, eventually prevailed. 5' The plan will take effect in
2012,52 the same year the WCI goes into effect, and there is sure to be extensive
future planning in order to expeditiously execute it. To be sure, California is
fortunate to have citizens and legislators who are willing to put such a plan in
action independently. However, with each WCI partner responsible for creating
its own enforceable program to comply with the WCI design, California will be
in a significantly better position to comply with the mandate of the WCI, as will
Canada, which ratified the Kyoto Protocol requiring an approximately five
percent reduction of emissions by 2012.' These jurisdictions have a head start
on meeting the emissions goals that the WCI will impose because they already
have programs in place, and industry is already prepared for the movement
towards reduced GHG.
If Europe proves to be an analogous system, the WCI potentially faces a
situation similar to the above-mentioned imbalance existing between Eastern and
Western Europe. There, the poorer eastern bloc nations must rely on cheaper
technologies thereby incurring a disproportionate amount of cost of compliance
with the reduction goals. In Europe, it is the poorest countries that demand softer
regulation' 4 and provide the strongest resistance."'
148. EU Politics, supra note 123.
149. Margot Roosevelt, State Orders Big Cuts in Gases: California Aims to Slash Greenhouse
Emissions 15% by 2020 with the Most Sweeping Plan of any State, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2008, available at
2008 WLNR 23843777.
150. See id.
151. Id.; see also California Global Warming Solution Act of 2006, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§
38500-38505 (West 2009) (statute supports the emissions goals set by the plan).
152. CAL. AIR RES. BD. FOR THE STATE OF CAL., CLIMATE CHANGE PROPOSED SCOPING PLAN: A
FRAMEWORK FOR CHANGE, at ES-1 (Oct. 2008), available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/scopingplan/
document/psp.pdf.
153. PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 143.
154. See INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK DATABASE (Oct. 2007),
available at http://www.imf.orglexternallpubslft/weo/2007/02/weodata/index.aspx (the 2007 Gross Domestic
Product, as measured by then-current prices in US billions, was: Latvia - $27.001, Bulgaria - $39.071, Slovakia
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Under a similar cap-and-trade system, those less prepared and less capable
partners will feel similarly disadvantaged. Some states are already making large
strides in reducing their GHG emissions, and should therefore have an easier
time complying with their share of the regional GHG emissions goals. Though it
remains to be seen, one needn't go too far to imagine that Montana (with a GDP
of $34.25 billion 5 6 and no current emissions plan in place) will have a
significantly more difficult time complying with regulations than British
Colombia-which has a carbon tax currently in place,'5' California (with a GDP
of $1,812.97 billion 8 and aggressive new emissions plan' 59), or Ontario (with
GDP of C$582.02 billion' 6° and the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol).
Poor economic conditions will only exacerbate the economic advantages
these states will have when the WCI begins in 2012. Unfortunately, absent strong
centralized method of enforcement, the economic disparity will likely make
uniform compliance extremely difficult. Hopefully, the good faith mechanisms
and public opinion will be able to hold states to their obligations.
IV. ENFORCEMENT: SERIOUS PROBLEM OR NON-ISSUE?
Stated in Section II of this comment, the Recommendations do not set out a
strong process for enforcement of the obligations contained therein. There is no
mention of the possible binding nature of the agreement, nor is there any outline
for a dispute resolution procedure-via arbitration or traditional court
proceedings.' 6' Nor do they establish a regulatory body to enforce compliance, or
set a fine for a failure to comply. 62 Instead, the Recommendations look to the
market to set the penalty.
63
Undoubtedly, some method of compliance is necessary. Compliance with the
obligations contained in the agreement not only reinforces the sanctity of the
agreement, but also is necessary to accomplish the very purpose of the
agreement' 64 - the agreement necessarily depending on uniform compliance.
Most importantly, enforcing compliance within the WCI ensures that non-
complying countries do not get a free ride. 65 This "free rider" problem manifests
- $71.574, Hungary - $136.358, Poland - $413.312).
155. See Kanter, Poland Leads Charge, supra note 127.
156. Recommendations, supra note 3, WCI Map located at beginning of document.
157. Id. at 4.
158. Id. WCI Map located at beginning of document.
159. California Global Warming Solution Act of 2006, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38501(c) (West
2009).
160. Recommendations, supra note 3, WCI Map located at beginning of document.
161. Id. at 46-47.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 46.
164. WEISS ET AL, supra note 45, at 177.
165. Id.
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itself in two primary ways. "First, the violating [state] benefits from the restraint
shown by others. . . ."'66 The WCI crucially relies on large regional compliance
to minimize the effect of carbon leakage. Because the operating cost in regulated
industries will increase slightly within WCI jurisdictions, partners not adequately
enforcing their regulatory obligations would be able to lure business away with
the temptation of lesser costs, consequently eroding the purpose potency of the
WCI. "Second, the violating [state] also benefits in not having to assume, or
having its industry assume, the cost of compliance . ,,67 This is the more direct
consequence of the free rider problem. It simply lowers the costs of enforcement
for the individual jurisdiction and on the industries regulated.
Though the absence of a generally agreed upon forum for dispute resolution
or a strong enforcement body may appear troublesome, this section argues that
the very nature of cap-and-trade systems alters the classic conceptions of
compliance and enforcement in such a way as to create a system that is self-
enforcing. The WCI separates itself from the classic Westphalian concept of
international law by which external arbitral bodies are necessary to ensure
compliance. Considering the unambiguous nature of compliance under a cap-
and-trade system and the shared interests of all partners involved, the WCI is
internally self-regulating.
A. Revised Notions of Compliance within the Cap-and-Trade Model
1. Compliance is Compliance
The WCI partners will almost certainly comply with their obligations despite
what appears to be a complete lack of centralized enforceability. But what does it
mean to be in compliance? Fascinatingly, a cap-and-trade system involves a
significantly easier notion of compliance than traditional models typically
employed in environmental enforcement. Professor Edith Brown Weiss states
that compliance is a fairly broad term, referring both to the implementation of the
agreement-the laws adopted to respect the agreement-and the extent to which
the party to the agreement respects and abides by those laws.' 68 It is this black and
white simplicity that may be the cap-and-trade model's greatest asset.
Compliance is compliance.
Compliance under a cap-and-trade approach is notably different from
traditional models. The process of conventional compliance is described as
"sometimes cooperative, sometimes conflictive"' 69 wherein facilities and agencies
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. See Edith Brown Weiss, Understanding Compliance with International Environmental
Agreements: The Baker's Dozen Myths, 32 U. RICH. L. REV. 1555, 1563 (1999) [hereinafter Weiss,
Understanding Compliance].
169. McAllister, supra note 50, at 302-03.
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(or perhaps more accurately, their lawyers) negotiate over what compliance
entails for that particular facility.'70 This results in a highly discretionary
relationship between the regulator and the regulated,'' one where the notion of
compliance is as much tied in with the ongoing negotiation process as it is with
the very environmental goal itself.12 Consequently, terms like "compliance
plans," 73 "substantial compliance,"'74 and "full compliance" infuse themselves
into the conversation. 175
Modem interpretation of the Trail Smelter Arbitration illustrates this variable
spectrum of compliance over what appears to be fairly straightforward rule or
principle. In extreme brief, the Trail Smelter arbitration is the quintessential case
on international transboundary pollution, 76 and provided the world with the
foundational principle in the field of international environmental law17 : "no State
has the right to use or permit the use of its territory in such a manner as to cause
injury by fumes in or to the territory of another or the properties or persons
,,171therein .... Modern interpretations of this principle underscore a major
problem with compliance: it will be unavoidably diluted in some shape or fashion
as the parties negotiate an agreement. The once clear golden rule of international
environmental law has subsequently eroded, now limiting only "'significant or
substantial' transboundary harm, and (is) perhaps further limited to include only
a duty by the source state to 'undertake due diligence ' ,179 in avoidance of
environmental harm.
Regulatory agencies embody this philosophy by diluting compliance into
Orwellian concepts such as "tolerable non-compliance," acknowledged as non-
compliant behavior, but one in which "identifying it as a violation is not
appropriate or necessary."'8 There are even the additional categories of "specific
and general" compliance; "[g]eneral compliance refer[ing] to the responsiveness
of the regulated sector as a whole; specific compliance refer[ing] to the
170. Id..
171. Id.at306.
172. Id. at 307.
173. id. ("Compliance plans, in which companies committed to taking a series of steps over a period of
time to attain compliance, were a central component of the compliance process.").
174. Id. at 310 ("A company is considered to be in substantial compliance when it attains most of the
standards most of the time.").
175. Id. ("Full compliance is recognized as an unattainable goal.").
176. Noah D. Hall, The Evolving Role of Citizens in United States-Canadian International
Environmental Law Compliance, 24 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 131, 141 (2007).
177. See id. at 141, 145 (noting that the liability principle from the arbitration was incorporated into
Principle 21 of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm Declaration of 1972).
178. Trail Smelter Arbitral Tribunal (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1938, 1965 (1941), available at
http://untreaty.un.org/cod/riaacases/vol_1I1905-1982.pdf.
179. Hall, supra note 176, at 146 (alteration in original) (quoting John H. Knox, The Myth and Reality of
Transboundary Environmental Impact Assessment, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 291, 293 (2002)).
180. McAllister, supra note 50, at 310.
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responsiveness of a particular regulated company."' 8 ' Principally, this confusion
results from the inherent ambiguity-or flexibility, depending on one's
perspective-within the statutory regulations the agencies enforce. 2
A cap-and-trade system avoids these shifting notions of compliance and the
subjective role of the regulators in making the determination. Subject to a more
objective determination, compliance under cap-and-trade is "ascertainable and
quantifiable."'83 Professor McAllister expresses the determination in a mercifully
uncomplicated manner: compliance = allowances-emissions.'8" Thus, facilities
are in compliance when their emissions do not exceed their allowances, or more
specifically, if the emissions do not exceed the sum of offsets and allowances
purchased by the facility on the open market. This straightforward approach to
compliance removes some of the standard factors in the compliance model.
First, a cap-and-trade compliance model largely eliminates the good faith
element because it removes from consideration the intent of the regulated
industry to comply with its obligations. Under a traditional compliance model,
facilities are frequently "in compliance"-failure to meet their standards
notwithstanding-based on their continuing good faith efforts to meet
objectives.'85 As a consequence, regulators tend to place less emphasis on the
actual environmental results of a regulation and too much emphasis on a
facility's environmental behavior. Conversely, a cap-and-trade compliance model
evaluates compliance in terms of objective results.
2. The Regulatory Pressure of the Social Stakeholder
Secondly, the role of the public-"the social stakeholder"-in exerting
regulatory pressures on the facility diminishes substantially.1 6 Professor
McAllister notes that under a traditional model, the public may exert external
regulatory pressures in three ways: "they could act as an auxiliary enforcer of
regulatory requirements;' 87 they could help bring about a tightening of regulatory
requirements by complaining to regulators; and they could push a facility to go
beyond-compliance in order to prove 'good citizenship.",
8 8
A study tracking the social pressures within the paper mill and paper pulp
manufacturing industry revealed that social issues are one of the principle
181. Id.
182. See id.
183. ld. at 317.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 300-01.
186. Id. at 313-14.
187. Id. at 313; see also 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a) (2000) (allows citizen lawsuits against: (a) polluters for
failing to comply with valid emission limitations; or (b) the Administrator of the EPA for failing to perform a
nondiscretionary act or duty).
188. McAllister, supra note 50, at 313-14
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stimulants in complying with environmental regulations.'" Examples of social
pressures exerting a force on facilities are indeed numerous. For instance, a 1991
law enacted by Canada obligates pulp mills to eliminate chlorinated organic
discharges by December 2002.190 Through constant efforts by Greenpeace to
mobilize support condemning the discharge practice, by 1998, the amount of
chlorinated organics had decreased almost ten-fold-several years before the
regulated time period.' 91 Whatever the reaction, corporations are motivated by
risk management calculations 92 and are primarily concerned that "not meeting
the requirements of the social license will ultimately result in increased
regulation or greater economic costs to the company. .. ."'9' For most of the
companies surveyed, the "social license" had a significant impact on the decision
making process.1
94
These extra methods of pressuring entities to comply with environmental
regulations are not necessarily present under a cap-and-trade compliance model.
With so many concepts of compliance, citizen groups could exert a greater
amount of pressure on a facility as a result of it being out of compliance in some
shape or form, or perhaps not as in compliance as one group would like.
However, when compliance is attached to an objective determination, social
pressures have less to work with-a facility is either in or out of compliance.
Furthermore, compliance tends to be disassociated from individual facility
performance under a cap-and-trade approach' 9' because compliance no longer
means a facility has reduced pollution emissions, or is abiding by a particular
regulation. Compliance simply means the facility did or did not buy enough
allowance credits. 96 Indeed, a facility could chose to either reduce emissions or
purchase more credits-both of which would mean the facility was in
compliance. Contrast with a traditional approach where only the reduction of
emissions would mean the facility was compliant. Thus, the actual behavior of
the facility becomes somewhat irrelevant to the context. The disassociated role of
a facility's behavior necessarily results in a public faced with a diminished
influence over that same behavior.
A cap-and-trade compliance model also diminishes, if not eliminates, the
traditional role of a regulatory body. Under a standard relationship between
189. Neil Gunningham, Robert A. Kagan & Dorothy Thornton, Social License and Environmental
Protection: Why Businesses Go Beyond Compliance, 29 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 307, 321 (2004) (reporting that a
manager of a paper mill was "motivated less by avoiding regulatory violations per se than by avoiding
'anything that could give [the company] a bad name."').
190. Id. at 322-23.
191. Id. at 323 ("The net effect was that in1991, chlorinated organic discharges from pulp mills in
British Columbia equaled 0.6 to 6.0 kg/ton, but by 1998... the range was 0.2 to 0.72 ... .
192. Id. at 336.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. McAllister, supra note 50, at 328.
196. See id. at 340.
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regulated and regulator, the regulatory agency negotiates with facilities to
determine whether they are in compliance (once again taking into account the
subjective good faith behavior of the facilities).' 97 Because compliance in a cap-
and-trade system merely refers to whether the facility acquired enough allowance
credits, the regulator becomes more of an "accountant" than anything else.' 9' The
system eliminates the necessity for discretion or bargaining or constant
evaluation in order to determine compliance. This leads to less conflict, less
negotiation, and less litigation.' 99 Consequently, the WCI will not actually need a
strong central regulatory body to regulate the program, but only a small one with
small authority. Our traditional notions of compliance, and of a strong agency to
ensure that compliance, is simply irrelevant for the WCI.
B. What is Enforcement?
The concept of enforcement under the cap-and-trade model is so significantly
different that standard notions of enforcing agreements are-like the compliance
discussion above-relatively immaterial. For purposes of evaluation, this paper
notes that enforcement is a process combining traditional notions of legal action,
as well as subtle influence upon the regulated .2
Enforcement of environmental agreements falls within two basic categories:
the legalistic style and the conciliatory style.2 ' "The legalistic style is based on
coercion[J" relying predominantly on the assessment of penalties and sanctions
to enforce an agreement.2 °2 Conversely, the conciliatory style relies on persuasion
and negotiation and "seeks to prevent a harm rather than punish an evil. 2 3
Studies indicate that the legalistic style is less efficient2°' than the conciliatory
style because the legalistic style involves litigation as well as political lobbying,
and therefore increases the cost without necessarily leading to greater results.205
These two styles are worth noting because under a cap-and-trade approach,
neither is applicable.
As mentioned previously, the regulator's primary purpose is to keep track of
the allowance issues and to monitor emissions reporting, no longer do regulators
197. See id. at 300.
198. Id. at 301 (stating that the role of the regulator is in "keeping track of a facility's emissions and
allowance holdings and seeing if they match at some predetermined time.").
199. See id.
200. See Id. at 311-12 ("Regulatory enforcement encompasses not just formal legal action by regulators
against regulated actors but the larger social process through which regulators influence the behavior of
regulated entities.").
201. McAllister, supra note 50, at 311.
202. Id. at 311-312.
203. Id. at 312 (quoting KEITH HAWKINS, ENVIRONMENT AND ENFORCEMENT: REGULATION AND THE
SOCIAL DEFINITION OF POLLUTION 4 (1984)).
204. Id.
205. Id. at 313 (defining efficiency as "the extent to which the regulatory style minimizes the social and
economic costs to attain the desired environmental improvement.").
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have to spend time and resources coercing or persuading entities to comply with
its obligations.'O6 For example, "[i]t has been estimated that of the seventy-five
EPA employees directly involved in administering the Acid Rain Program,
approximately 75% are focused on the measurement, verification, and tracking of
emissions data. '20 7 Under cap-and-trade systems, facilities know precisely what
compliance entails, and are permitted the flexibility to achieve that compliance in
the most cost-effective manner. 0 8 Contrast this with a standard regulatory system
where the regulator tells the facility how to meet the regulations, haggling with
the facilities over litigation, and then ensuring that they carried it out. °9 Given
this reduced role, the WCI will have little need for an organization capable of
enforcing the agreement.
C. The Public Role in Enforcement
The public role of enforcement is not simply a fallback method for the WCI
to use. Rather, it is an effective and efficient method for enforcing obligations
(not to be confused with the previous discussion on the irrelevance of the public
role in determining compliance). Mentioned previously in this part, section B(1),
the role of the public, or "social stakeholder" 2" can be very effective. Given the
success of such social pressures, many international agreements now
acknowledge them as legitimate means of enforcement.
The United States and Canada formed the Air Quality Agreement in 1991 to
address the shared problem of acid rain."' The United States implemented the
agreement by creating the Acid Rain Program, discussed supra, part II, section B.
The agreement contains a provision mandating communication between the
parties and the states and provinces as well as the public in general.22
Importantly, this provision "provides a means by which.., state or provincial
governments, citizens, and interest groups, can exert substantial pressure on the
[parties] to implement and effectuate the objectives of the agreement.",2 3 The
prevalence of these citizen participation provisions emphasizes their success.
Perhaps the most recognizable citizen enforcement provision is that
contained in the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation
("NAAEC"). The Agreement enforces environmental concerns as part of the
206. Id. at 326.
207. id. at 327.
208. Id. at 328.
209. See id.
210. McAllister, supra note 50, at 313-14.
211. Hall, supra note 176, at 150-51.
212. Agreement on Air Quality, U.S.-Can., at 4, Mar. 13, 1991, TIAS No. 11,783, amended by Protocol
Amending the Agreement on Air Quality, U.S.-Can., Dec. 7, 2000, Temp. State Dep't No. 01-20, Hein's No.
KAV 5863.
213. Jeffrey L. Roelofs, United States-Canada Air Quality Agreement: A Framework for Addressing
Transboundarv Air Pollution Problems, 26 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 421, 449 (1993).
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North American Free Trade Act ("NAFTA") through the Commission for
Environmental Cooperation ("CEC").1 4 With the passage of NAFTA there were
concerns the increase in trade would cause the member countries to neglect
enforcement of their environmental laws.'. Principally, environmentalists
believed Mexico would fail to enforce its environmental regulations.2 6 In
response, NAFTA implemented the NAAEC. 2 7  One of the most striking
provisions within the NAAEC is the "citizen submission procedure" contained in
articles fourteen and fifteen.2 8  Known as an "international spotlight," it
encourages domestic compliance with environmental regulations within Canada,
Mexico, and the United States. 2'9 A submission may be made by "any non-
governmental organization or person asserting that a Party is failing to effectively
enforce its environmental law"[.] ' 2 0 The spotlight prohibits certain submissions,
221
malicious submissions among them. If the Secretariat determines that it
concerns an issue of environmental law, and is not prohibited, the matter is
referred to the CEC for further determination of appropriate action.222
Though effective in bringing alleged environmental violations to light, the
citizen submission procedure is not the final word and citizens are "still unable to
ultimately force compliance with international environmental commitments on
unwilling federal governments., 223 Professor Hall recounts a recent situation
where concerned citizens from both Canada and the U.S. informed the CEC of
transboundary water pollution of the Devil's Lake in North Dakota, an apparent
214. David L. Markell, Governance of International Institutions: A Review of the North American
Commission for Environmental Cooperation's Citizen Submissions Process, 30 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
759, 759-60 (2005).
215. E.g. John H. Knox, A New Approach to Compliance with International Environmental Law: The
Submissions Procedure of The NAFTA Environmental Commission, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 54 (2001) (noting
additional concerns that "by removing barriers to foreign investment in Mexico, NAFTA would lure companies
to move there in search of a 'pollution haven,' and thereby contribute to the pollution of the Mexican
environment, take jobs from U.S. workers, and put pressure on all three North American countries to lower their
environmental standards in a 'race to the bottom.'').
216. See Id.
217. Id.
218. See David L. Markell, The Commission for Environmental Cooperation's Citizen Submission
Process, 12 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 545, 550 (2000).
219. Markell, supra note 214, at 762.
220. North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, U.S.-Can.-Mex., art. 14(1), Sept. 9-14
1993, 32 I.L.M. 1480 (defining "environmental law" as "any statute or regulation of a Party, or provision
thereof, the primary purpose of which is the protection of the environment, or the prevention of a danger to
human life or health .... ).
221. North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, U.S.-Can.-Mex., art. 14(2), Sept. 9-14
1993, 32 I.L.M. 1480 ("(a) the submission alleges harm to the person or organization making the submission;
(b) the submission, alone or in combination with other submissions, raises matters whose further study in this
process would advance the goals of this Agreement; (c) private remedies available under the Party's law have
been pursued; and (d) the submission is drawn exclusively from mass media reports.")
222. North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, U.S.-Can.-Mex., art. 14(1), Sept. 9-14
1993, 32 I.L.M. 1480 ("Where the Secretariat determines that a submission meets the criteria set out in
paragraph 1, the Secretariat shall determine whether the submission merits requesting a response from nacec.").
223. Hall, supra 176, at 156.
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violation of the Boundary Waters Treaty.224 The Secretariat of the CEC ultimately
dismissed the submission, in part because the Boundary Waters Treaty itself did
not call for a citizen submission procedure.25 Thus, the citizen submission failed
to enforce the domestic environmental obligations of the two nations. The
procedure, however, still has great value because it serves as a factual record of
alleged abuses.226 This publication of negative environmental conduct can serve
to eventually pressure the governments to act.
227
D. Reputational and Voluntary Compliance-Based Adherence to International
Law
Though there is no outside regulatory body to enforce WCI obligations, the
notions of voluntary compliance and reputational preservation assure the partners
will uphold their commitments. These ideas are quickly gaining traction with
scholars in the international law field22 as a means of explaining why states
respect their commitments, even in the face of de minimis or non-existent legal
sanctions. Whatever the true motivation, the general principle of international
law as stated by Professor Henkin, is that "almost all nations observe ... their
obligations almost all of the time. 229 Scholars dispute whether this principle finds
its justification in the general behavior of states (voluntary), or in the strength of
the threat of sanctions (economic or trade restrictions, reputational
damage/prestige, etc.). 210
Both models rely on the assumption that states act rationally and within their
231 232
own interests, or rational-actor model of international law 2. Because the WCI
addresses the problem of greenhouse gases, which extend well beyond the
borders of the individual partner or the partner's neighboring states, a substantial
reduction in GHG emissions will almost certainly benefit each partner to the
agreement. The Recommendations proclaim that the impact of climate change
observed in the region is the prime impetus behind the agreement. Conditions
ranging from the earlier onset of spring and the consequent reduction in frost-free
days, prolonged drought and increased flooding, growing number of wildfires,
224. Id. at 156-57.
225. Id. at 157-58.
226. Id. at 158.
227. Id.
228. See, e.g., Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law, 90 CAL. L. REV.
1823 (2002).
229. WEISS ET AL, supra note 45, at 200 (citing Louis HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE 47 (2d ed.
1979).
230. See generally Guzman, supra note 228.
23 1. Id. at 1827. But see Weiss, Understanding Compliance, supra note 168, at 1559 ("Sometimes states
join because the agreements do not require changes in their present actions, or they may join with no intention
of complying or lacking the capacity to comply.").
232. Guzman, supra note 228, at 1860.
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shrinking glaciers and reduced snow pack, and reduced air quality.. represent the
common purpose that each of the jurisdictions share.
Furthermore, the Recommendations share a common economic interest as
well2" because reduction in total GHG levels necessarily carries with it an
investment in green technology, as well as reduced fuel and energy
• 235
consumption. The rational-actor model of international law assumes that states
will behave rationally and in their own best interests. Because each partner shares
the similar interests of reduced air pollution, increased preservation of natural
resources, and creation of jobs, these interests will unite the partners and
motivate each to respect the WCI. Additionally, the theory of voluntary
compliance asserts that states voluntarily assent to those agreements that they
voluntarily make. 36 The rationale for this is relatively common sense, after all,
why would a state enter an agreement they did not intend on upholding?
In a correlative to the voluntary theory, Professor Guzman, environmental
law professor at the University of California Berkeley School of Law,237 develops
the theory that the desire to maintain reputational integrity motivates states to
abide by their agreements.:238 States are typically very reluctant to be branded a
violator of agreements. 239 Thus, publicity and reputation provide "an effective
incentive to implement and thereby comply with international obligations.,
240
While not typically thought of as such, the reputational incentive is very
much a type of sanction.24 Because the WCI has no enforcement board, and
establishes no penalties for non-compliance, this may be the only international
sanction available. Professor Guzman indicates four factors influencing the
strength of reputational sanctions: 43 "(1) the severity of the violation, (2) the
reasons for the violation, (3) the extent to which other states know of the
violation, and (4) the clarity and commitment of the violation."2"
The alignment of these factors with the general framework of the WCI
suggests that reputational sanctions will be very effective. The most significant of
these factors is the severity of the violation.245 Those violations that cause a
greater harm to neighboring states will necessarily result in greater reputational
233. RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 3, at 15.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. WEISS ET AL, supra note 45, at 178.
237. Andrew T. Guzman is a Professor of Law and Director of Advanced Legal Degree Programs at the
University of California, Berkeley, School of Law. He holds a J.D. and Ph.D. in economics from Harvard
University.
238. Guzman, supra note 230, at 1825.
239. See WEISS ET AL, supra note 45, at 180.
240. Id.
241. See Guzman, supra note 228, at 1861.
242. See RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 3, § 2(1.15).
243. Guzman, supra note 230, at 1861.
244. Id.
245. See id. at 1862-63.
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harm than those that are "victimless. '246 Applied to the WCI, the approximate
degree of severity an emissions cap violation brings is debatable. Depending on
the partners' interpretation of the violation, failure to comply could be seen as a
direct cause of increased warming, shorter winters, and species death; 27 or the
partners may see a violation merely as the proverbial drop in the bucket-
relatively benign given the total amount of world GHG emissions. More likely
the partners will interpret non-compliance as a sort of laziness; especially in light
of the strides the rest of the partners must make to implement the
Recommendations. Though the actual impact may be small, failure to "get on
board" may be severe enough.
The reasons for the violation also influence the effect of reputational
sanctions. 48 This factor reflects the reality that compliance with international
agreements is imperfect and violations inevitably occur,249 it being "understood
that under certain conditions a state will choose to ignore its obligations.
'
"
250
Absent the presence of a crisis of some sort,5 this consideration is unlikely to
impact WCI partners much because given the relative homogenous quality of all
partners (western states, developed economies, political stability, etc.), excuse for
noncompliance will not find a sympathetic ear; either all are capable of dealing
with any problem, or all are affected by the same. The third and fourth factors are
rather obvious. The two factors-(1) how much the partner jurisdictions are
aware of the violation; and (2) how clear the obligation and violation themselves
are-immediately impact the violation's reputational effect. 52 The awareness of a
violation is unimportant for the WCI because the Recommendations establish an
intentionally transparent process with the establishment of the "regional
organization, 253 which among other responsibilities, will "track emissions and
provide public information on progress towards the WCI regional goal. 254
Additionally, the WCI clearly lays out strong guidelines for what constitutes
compliance, and likewise what amounts to a violation.2" If all goes accordingly,
the Recommendations will establish a process where the partner jurisdictions will
always know when another is in non-compliance. Professor Guzman's factors
underscore a key tenet implicit in the underlying context of the
Recommendations. Because non-compliance will be transparent, unambiguous,
246. Id. at 1862.
247. See RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 3, at 15-16.
248. Guzman, supra note 228, at 1863.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 1862.
251. Id. (illustrating that "a human-rights treaty is viewed in a different light when it takes place under
conditions of great national crisis than if the violation occurs during a period of normalcy").
252. Id.
253. See RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 3, at 47-48 ("[Tjhe regional organization will help reduce
costs and improve program transparency and consistency.").
254. Id. at 16.
255. See generally id.
430
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unexcused, and rather severe, the reputational sanctions stand to be extremely
effective.
Reputational sanctions also avoid the "free rider" problem discussed earlier
in this comment, though from an opposite perspective. In situations of
multilateral agreements, the free rider problem surfaces when not every country
equally supports the cost of enforcing obligations.256 While the sanctioning
jurisdiction must support the cost of enforcement, it gains only a fraction of the
benefit, while other parties to the agreement gain equal benefit, having avoided
the financial burden associated with enforcing that gain.257 Under traditional
multilateral agreements, this benefit with no cost creates an incentive to be the
free rider, which in itself can result in a less effective agreement due to the
execution of fewer sanctions and less enforcement. 21' Efficiently, the use of
reputational sanction avoids this problem while remaining effective.
However, reputational sanctions only have value if a sort of "reputational
capital ' 25 9 exists. There must be an interest-either present or future-in
preserving the capacity to enter into effective agreements. Though the partners to
the WCI have not entered into many cross-boarder agreements with each other,
the importance and effectiveness of agreements such as the Great Lakes Charter,
Great Lakes Basin Compact, Friendship Protocol between Russia and Alaska-
all discussed supra-speak to the value of state-provincial agreements. The
primary agreement existing between some of the partners is the Oil Spill
Memorandum in which the pacific states each share responsibility for responding
to and remedying oil spills. 260 For these states, there is remarkable reputational
value in upholding one's commitments because a failure to adequately honor
one's obligations under the WCI could infect the sanctity of the Oil Spill
Memorandum, and vice versa. Furthermore, non-compliance could affect any
future ability to engage in cross-boarder agreements.
For the WCI, much of the reputational capital descends from the shear
necessity and substantial value of these types of agreements. Regional
agreements such as the WCI, Oil Spill Memorandum, Great Lakes Charter, and
others, may accomplish their objectives better than nationally sponsored
executive treaties for a number of reasons. For one, they can focus on the specific
problems affecting a specific region without distraction from political or financial
peripheral interests.26' Contrast this advantage with the U.S. Congress where
limitless groups with minor interests often exert disproportionate influence,
inevitably distorting the intended effect of the agreement. Secondly, these
256. Guzman, supra note 228, at 1869.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 1846.
260. See Oil Spill Memorandum, supra 97.
261. See Jennetten, supra note 71, at 142-43.
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regional agreements are "more responsive to local needs '2 63 because the
proportion of representation by the parties to the agreements is far larger than the
representation they would receive in Congress where states themselves exert little
influence.2" Furthermore, these agreements typically address problems that may
lack the importance necessary to provoke government action.265 Though the WCI
is large in scope and effect and thus not affected by this concern, future
agreements between, for example border states Montana and British Colombia,
could unequivocally benefit from an agreement that need not involve the U.S.
Congress.
Finally, regional agreements benefit from what this comment refers to as "the
triumph of the commons." Essentially, this concept is the amalgam of the
avoidance of the "prisoner's dilemma,"266 meaning the situation that exists when
lack of regulation-particularly involving collective pollutants like GHG-
removes incentive to self-regulate (no purpose in regulation when neighbor will
pollute anyway); and the benefits resulting from combined action and pooling of
resources "to combat a common problem. 267 What is so amazing about this
combination is that it singularly provides the incentives to create the WCI and
provides the primary mechanism by which the WCI will be self-enforcing. It
creates a mutual interest that spans all of the partners. Each affected by the
hazards of unregulated GHG emissions, and each requiring the full participation
of every other partner in league to make any sort of difference. When one
considers this triumph alongside the partner's desire to maintain their
reputational capital so that they may retain the ability to engage in future regional
agreements, the true effectiveness of the WCI surfaces.
However, States still fail to comply with their obligations, reputational harm
and voluntary good intentions notwithstanding. Studies indicate this failure "is
only infrequently due to willful defiance and is more often due to ignorance or to
technical or economic disability., 268 This finding implies that the appropriate
remedial measures "should instead consist of education and of the rendering of
appropriate assistance. '' 269 This concept makes a compelling case that a rigid
enforcement scheme consistent with traditional notions of international law is
unnecessary. Proper enforcement-if we are to understand the term as ensuring
that the partners sustain their obligations-lies most adequately in a
comprehensive and well-drafted program founded in the coequal input of the
partners.
263. Id.
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The WCI shares a common purpose while also placing the reputations of
eleven states and provinces at issue. These two enormous incentives, when
coupled with considerable guidance from the Recommendations provide a de
facto enforcement mechanism as effective as any court of international justice.
V. CONCLUSION
The cap-and-trade approach to the WCI requires a new understanding of
what it means to be in compliance. This approach does not require the centralized
enforcement structure the international community is accustomed to, yet remains
equally as effective as the traditional framework. It is little wonder the
Recommendations do not call for any sort enforcement body. It is simply
unnecessary. Instead, the partners' shared interests and the conspicuous nature of
the compliance obligation eliminate the necessity for such a body - the triumph
of the commons creating an internally enforcing agreement. Though the absence
of it in the Recommendations appear alarming and seem to create an
unenforceable agreement, nothing could be further from the case. The WCI will
likely bind the states and create an effective, low cost system of environmental
regulation that should ultimately result in a decisive reduction in GHG emissions.

